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account of Sophia Kovalevsky. Readers of Historia Mathematics, however, will 
probably prefer prosaic truth to poetic fiction. For such readers, fortunately, an 
adequate biography of Kovalevsky exists. The reviewer recommends A Conuer- 
gence ofLives by Ann Hibner Koblitz (Boston: Birkhauser, 1983) as the biogra- 
phy of choice. 
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This volume, modest in accomplishment if not in aspiration, is described by the 
author as having been based on lectures, and its final form betrays its origin by a 
lack of coherent structure. The Introduction reviews some elementary mathemat- 
ics and includes the proof that the square root of 2 is irrational. The first chapter 
takes up Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and the second, Frege’s criticisms of 
it, and the next two repeat this arrangement with Mill taking the place of Kant. 
There follow three chapters on Frege, two on Dedekind, a brief one on Peano, 
and finally two more on Frege, with more leisurely looks at some of the details of 
his notation. The end comes suddenly with the appearance of Russell’s paradox 
and the author’s claim that “the paradoxes raised new problems, and an analysis 
of the attempts to solve these problems lies beyond the limits of the present 
work.” Two appendixes include a review of contemporary logical notation and a 
statement and example of the principle of mathematical induction. 
It is difflcult to tell at what audience Dr. Gillies has directed this book. Inconsis- 
tencies in the level of presentation (such as defining Peano’s notation for inequal- 
ity in the chapter after that in which it first appeared) suggest that different 
chapters were intended for readers at different levels of logical sophistication. 
Although the mathematical level taken for granted is not advanced, the author 
does not bother to define “equivalence relation.” Similarly, his treatment of Kant 
assumes no familiarity with the Critique of Pure Reason, but his reference to “the 
Bayesians” on page 30 could leave the reader in the dark as to what the name 
represents. The second appendix (on induction) will be confusing in notation for 
those who have not seen the subject before and unnecessary for those who have. 
The kernel of the book is the concluding discussion of Frege, which is preceded 
(page 70) by a table putting Frege, Dedekind, and Peano in a variety of classifica- 
tions. The most interesting of these is the column headed “Ancestor of the follow- 
ing ideas”: to Frege is attributed type theory, to Dedekind axiomatic set theory, 
and to Peano Hilbert formalism; the author’s discussion of these suggests some 
sort of shape for 19th~century work on the foundations of mathematics. A short- 
coming of these suggestions is that not enough attention is given to the later 
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developments as represented, for example, in G. Moore’s book on Zermelo, 
which has subsequently appeared. In fact, the student of Frege can now enjoy a 
selection of introductions to his mathematical philosophy (e.g., Michael Dum- 
mett’s two volumes and Crispin Wright’s even more recent study) and can dip into 
Hans Sluga’s contribution on Frege to the Arguments of the Philosophers series 
for thorough historical investigation. Problems in interpreting Frege remain open, 
but Dr. Gillies has little opportunity to deal with them in his brief treatment. 
Perhaps a note on the typography of the book is in order. The misprints (drop- 
ping a parenthesis or quotation marks, misspellings, and transpositions) are never 
serious. The problem is that any book which seeks to encompass the idiosyncratic 
notations of both Frege and Peano faces a heavy burden; the mixture of Roman, 
italic, and bold faces helps to prepare the reader for what is coming but lacks 
legibility itself. The example of Maxwell’s equations given on page 28, and the 
printer’s use of inverted “e” for the partial differentiation sign, present another 
hurdle for the author to overcome when the material is already hard enough. 
Perhaps the book is best seen as an introduction to the philosophy of mathemat- 
ics which happens to take certain figures in the 19th century as central. The author 
briefly refers to his conviction that Sir Karl Popper’s views on mathematical 
reality are closer to the truth than those examined here, but again he does not have 
the space to set them out for judgment. Some of the basic issues in the philosophy 
of mathematics do not have a chance to emerge in the framework adopted herein, 
while historical details suffer from the same crowding. If the author had given 
himself more space in which to attack the variety of problems and issues which he 
raises, it would have been easier for him to do justice to his perspective on the 
connections between these founders of mathematical logic. 
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Over the past quarter of a century there has been a tremendous expansion of 
research on the life and work of Isaac Newton. Among the outstanding publica- 
tions that have appeared are the Royal Society edition of Newton’s Correspon- 
dence, the edition of the Principiu with variant readings undertaken jointly by 
Alexandre Koyre and I. Bernard Cohen, to which the latter has supplied a schol- 
arly Introduction and the monumental edition of the Mathematical Papers by 
D. T. Whiteside. To this selection of impressive contributions to Newtonian 
scholarship may now be added Richard S. Westfall’s biography, the fruit of 
